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I. INTRODUCTION
The distinction between specific concrete rules and general abstract
principles has engaged legal theorists for decades.1 This rules–principles
distinction has also become increasingly important in corporate and securities law, as well as financial market regulation. One prominent example
is the contrast between U.S. rules-based accounting—which attempts to
specify in detail what parties should disclose—and European principlesbased accounting—which sets forth only general notions of disclosure.2
This Article adds two important variables to the rules–principles
debate: timing and source. Although these two variables are relevant to
legal theory generally, the specific goal here is not to address and engage
the rules versus principles literature directly. Rather, the goal here is to
ask whether the debate about financial market regulation might benefit
from a more transparent analysis of temporal and legal source variables.
That is, the when and where of the application of both rules and principles.
From capital requirements, to investment restrictions, to disclosure
rules, much modern financial market regulation is focused on ex ante
regulation.3 This focus on ex ante regulation is especially true outside the
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1. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 1994)
(1961); Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1977).
2. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes–Oxley, and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (discussing the rules–principles debate in the
context of the collapse of Enron and responsive regulation). See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2007).
3. See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives
Regulation?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 213 (Robert E. Litan &
Richard Herring eds., 2001). I first set forth the analytic structure for analyzing the source and timing of regulation in this article, and I draw explicitly from it in this essay.
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United States and England, particularly in Asia, where regulators rely
less on the private attorney general role of the plaintiffs’ bar.4 In contrast,
decades ago, regulators throughout the world, but particularly in the
United States, took more of an ex post approach. These regulators emphasized adjudication or regulatory assessment after-the-fact based on
general principles rather than specific rules.5 This Article seeks to provide a framework for understanding and assessing the shift from ex ante
to ex post and from principles to rules.
In theory, rules or principles can be either specified in advance or
applied after-the-fact, and can be applied both by private or public
means. For example, either a regulator or private party might favor principles that are established early and then adjudicated later. Alternatively,
a regulator or private party might favor principles that are established
later, only after a dispute occurs. Likewise, a regulatory approach might
specify rules in advance of a transaction, or it might do so later on in the
event of a dispute. In a dispute involving either principles or rules, the ex
post adjudicator might be private or public: either an arbitrator or a
judge.
The complexity of modern markets has led to the proliferation of ex
ante rules, which purport to provide greater certainty to regulators and
market participants.6 In some cases, that certainty is important and welcome. In other cases, it has deleterious consequences. The proliferation
of rules raises numerous policy questions, including whether financial
markets would be better served by greater regulatory uncertainty. Market
participants, then, would be less able to calculate the expected benefits
and costs of complying with regulation based on anticipated probabilities
and magnitudes.

4. See Douglas Arner, Professor, Univ. of Hong Kong Dep’t of Law, Remarks at the Fifth
Annual Berle Symposium, The Purpose and Nature of Financial Regulation (May 13, 2013) (transcript available at Seattle University School of Law Library). Of course, the public civil enforcement
role is arguably more significant and influential outside the United States, particularly in Australia.
5. See Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting,
(Roosevelt Inst. White Paper, Mar. 2010), available at http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/
all/files/Off-Balance%20Sheet%20Transactions.pdf; http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/policy-and-id
eas/ideas-database/bring-transparency-balance-sheet-accounting.
6. In many prominent cases, this certainty is illusory. As of September 3, 2013, 280 of the
rulemaking deadlines under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 had passed, yet there were final rules in place for only 108 (39%) of those items. See Dodd–
Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-FrankRulemaking-Progress-Report/; see also Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Pending Action, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dod
d-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
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This Article does not seek to comprehensively answer the central
questions about the optimal regulatory approach in financial markets, but
instead, it poses a new way to ask those questions. For example, might ex
ante principles act as an information-forcing mechanism and create incentives for private actors to internalize the costs of their behavior?
Might the twin pillars of securities law—disclosure and enforcement—be
better supported by a less certain regulatory approach that specifies broad
principles ex ante, and then provides for adjudication of compliance ex
post? Might there be advantages to simply banning “proprietary trading”
as a general principle and then leaving the specific definitional challenges and issues for adjudicators to resolve and formulate in future disputes,
instead of attempting to specify the categories of permitted activity ex
ante in a rules-based approach such as the Volcker Rule?7 Should parties
be permitted to avoid fraud-related claims by including broad nonreliance provisions in contracts? Should judges scrutinize disclaimers
based on the actions of a party with superior information or sophistication?
These are difficult questions, but they can be made more tractable
by framing them in terms of the timing and the source of the relevant
legal rules and principles. The goal here is to provide an analytic model
to assess crucial aspects of these questions by focusing on the different
types of ex ante and ex post regulatory approaches, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of each in modern, complex financial markets. The normative conclusions of this Article will necessarily be tentative, but my suggestion is that in many cases, there is wisdom in the historical approach based on after-the-fact assessment. Thus, regulators and
policy makers might benefit from considering the advantages of moving
away from ex ante regulation in the direction of ex post adjudication.
II. THE TIMING AND SOURCE OF LEGAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES
The 2x2 diagram below illustrates the analytic structure offered
here and the four polar approaches to regulation. Essentially, the four
divisions are based on answers to two questions. First, how much regulatory substance should be specified upfront, before or at the time of a

7. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, § 619.
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transaction, as opposed to in the future? Second, who should do the specifying? In other words, what is the timing and source of regulation?

Private
Public

Ex Ante
Contract
Regulation

Ex Post
Arbitration
Adjudication

The Article’s positive claim is that regulation can be situated in,
evolved along, or moved toward four different paths, depending on the
timing and source of applicable legal rules. The applicable legal rules can
be generated either ex ante or ex post, from entities that are either public
or private.
A. Contract
The upper left quadrant—“Contract”—houses regulation that is
specified in advance by private actors. This form of private “regulation”
is increasingly prevalent. For example, one notable use of such private
ordering in the financial markets is in over-the-counter derivatives,
where hundreds of trillions of dollars of notional value of transactions
are governed by documents created by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a trade group known as “ISDA.” U.S. corporate
law also generally allows for extensive private ordering through ex ante
specification of default rules.
Private ordering through contract has obvious benefits, particularly
when market participants are engaged in repeat play and there are reputational consequences to breaches. Ex ante contract rules are most likely to
be optimal when transaction and agency costs are low, when there is parity of information and sophistication between counterparties, and when
the expected costs of market failures (particularly externalities and moral
hazard) are minimal. Private ordering is less likely to be optimal when
these conditions do not exist.
Private actors can gather the capacity to specify ex ante rules
through lobbying and influencing regulators and legislators. Thus, private contract does not necessarily become a libertarian regime. Parties
specifying legal rules can enjoy oligopolistic advantages due to being a
first mover, such as barriers to entry or explicit exercise of market power.
Both ex ante rules and principles are potentially subject to such influence. Private parties often have an information or sophistication advantage over public entities and are potentially more nimble and flexible.
As a result, private ordering can better reflect private preferences, especially when large institutions are contracting with each other and there is
repeat play.
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B. Arbitration
The upper right quadrant—“Arbitration”—involves the assessment
of parties’ conduct after the fact, typically based on generalized principles. For example, broker–client disputes are perhaps the most prominent
example of this form of regulation. Perhaps U.S. corporate law might
ultimately permit corporations to opt for arbitration in their bylaws, charters, or both. Interestingly, ISDA documentation typically specifies that
disputes involving over-the-counter derivatives will be resolved in federal court in New York or under British law in London, but not through
arbitration.
Private arbitration can provide for helpful assessment of parties’
conduct after-the-fact, typically based on generalized principles. Arbitration is especially useful when parties have not specified contingencies ex
ante or when they have done so but in an ambiguous manner. As with
contract, arbitration can be subject to various forms of influence and
market failure, including asymmetries in sophistication and information.
Moreover, arbitration typically does not generate the benefits of
precedent more generally associated with common law. Instead, disputes
and results typically remain private and are therefore less useful to parties anticipating or engaged in future disputes. The result can be inconsistent application of ex ante principles and disparate results. Of course,
the same problems can be true of public adjudication by judges, but at
least there is a public record of judicial decision making.
C. Regulation
The lower left quadrant, labeled “Regulation,” includes most modern financial and securities regulation. This body of legal rules has grown
in recent years, as Congress and federal regulators have specified numerous detailed rules for disclosure, conduct, capital requirements, and other
substantive decisions and actions. The increasing specification of legal
rules ex ante has created opportunities and incentives for regulatory arbitrage,8 particularly in areas related to tax, accounting, and credit ratings.
It has also created “regulatory licenses,” entitlements that enable oligopolistic private actors to influence and determine compliance with
regulation.9

8. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); see also Jordan
Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 69 (2011); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211 (1997).
9. I used the term “regulatory license” in Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619 (1999). Credit
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Public regulation has potential benefits that are not generated by
private contract. In theory, regulation can address market failures that
private ordering cannot. However, regulators are subject to capture, and
the public choice literature has demonstrated how regulation can favor
particular groups instead of benefiting society overall. To some extent
regulatory arbitrage is helpful in identifying rules that might be too costly to justify their benefits. Yet regulatory arbitrage also can generate inefficiencies, reduce transparency, and help private actors, whose public
benefits exceed its private costs, avoid regulation. Regulatory licenses
have the potential to assist regulators who are unable to police or understand financial markets on their own, but they introduce distortions and
over reliance, both of which can lead to serious problems (and were arguably at the center of the recent financial crisis). Much modern financial
regulation incentivizes regulatory arbitrage and creates regulatory licenses.
D. Adjudication
Meanwhile, the lower right quadrant, labeled “Adjudication,” has
grown smaller, particularly in the most complex parts of the financial
markets. This decrease in adjudication exists even while it remains prominent in other areas of corporate and securities regulation where, perhaps
not coincidentally, the legal principles and rules are less certain. These
areas include insider trading, deal litigation, “plain vanilla” securities
class actions, and, periodically, scandal-related litigation (e.g., options
backdating and subprime-related fraud).10
Adjudication can fill gaps left by contract and regulation. In addition, adjudication can potentially fill the gaps in a more complete and
public manner than arbitration can. Through adjudication, courts can address financial scandals and disputes in public ways that can both deter
future abuse and create a framework for a new generation of private ordering. Likewise, adjudication allows courts to scrutinize prosecutions
and settlements, thereby influencing not only private conduct but also
regulator and prosecutor behavior.11
rating-dependent regulation has been one of the most prominent recent examples of regulatory licenses.
10. For example, in Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007), the Delaware Chancery
Court forcefully maintained that the Delaware courts would be an adequate and desirable venue for
assessing stock option backdating disputes, finding that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of
liability for their roles related to backdating.
11. Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the Securities and Exchange Commission settlement in the
Citigroup litigation was a prominent example. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Nonetheless, the use of adjudication has declined because it is expensive and courts face scarce resources. Moreover, existing adjudication
has become less useful because the body of cases addressing particular
issues is so narrowly targeted and specialized that on-point precedents
relevant to complex financial transactions can be unavailable. To some
extent, uncertainty can be addressed by more sophisticated judicial reasoning. However, it is difficult to draw connections between disparate
areas of finance, even for the most financially sophisticated judges.12
Overall, the above 2x2 diagram can be used to consider different
types of financial regulation and, more generally, to assess the source
and timing of legal rules and principles. However, most regulation is not
isolated within one of the four quadrants. Instead, it is a blend of one or
more aspects of ex ante/ex post timing and public/private sourcing. For
example, securities exchange-based regulation is primarily in the lower
left quadrant, but elements of some rules—such as the independence requirements of directors—are necessarily assessed ex post. Conversely,
although broker-dealer regulation is primarily in the upper right quadrant, some basic requirements are specified in advance. Nonetheless, although the lines are blurred, the polar modes of regulation are useful for
analytic purposes.
One question raised by the shift in some areas of financial regulation from ex post to ex ante specification and from public to private is
determining the optimal degree of regulation certainty. Some private actors—particularly large financial institutions—benefit from certainty and
seek the detailed specification in ex ante rules through lobbying. Conversely, other market participants—such as less sophisticated investors—
benefit from uncertainty and prefer vague notions of fiduciary duty or
fraud that can be enforced ex post.
The classic elements of securities laws already have a degree of uncertainty built into them through the ex post enforcement of broad, openended principles such as the general prohibition of fraud. Disclosure requirements and materiality are examples, as is securities fraud, where

12. For example, even judges in Delaware have struggled to articulate standards for boards of
directors and the management of business risk. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011
WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). It remains an open question whether courts should decide
disputes involving business risk under different standards or whether judges will view cases involving complex financial products as analogous to cases involving business risk. Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously told the story of a Vermont justice of the peace who, after considering a suit
brought by one farmer against another for breaking a churn, ruled for the defendant because he had
looked through the statutes and could not find anything about churns.
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uncertainty is common.13 The question is whether the costs of uncertainty
are outweighed by the benefits of deterrence. Specifically, are market
participants reasonably well situated to understand what “core conduct”
will be prohibited ex post and therefore avoid straying too close ex ante?
The answer depends on assumptions about the social value of deterred
transactions. For example, one might accept the deterrence of transactions that fall into the gray areas of insider trading, but not the deterrence
of structure finance activities that fall into the gray areas of suitability.
The effects of uncertainty vary in the context of complex modern financial practice. The next Part considers the application of the timing versus
source rubric in the context of financial innovation.
III. APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL INNOVATION
To illustrate the application of this analytical model to particular areas of regulation, this Part briefly considers the regulation of selling
complex financial products, including derivatives. Financial intermediaries divide such transactions into two categories: counterparty transactions
and client transactions. 14 Counterparty transactions include over-thecounter derivatives transactions and other privately negotiated transactions. Banks generally refer to a wide range of such transactions as
“market-making,” varying from traditional market-making activities,
such as stock trading, to newer activities, such as credit default swaps
and collateralized debt obligations.15
Over time, the rights and obligations of parties to such transactions
have moved from ex post public adjudication based on principles to ex
ante specification of rules by private organizations. 16 Financial institutions, particularly banks and investment banks, negotiated and lobbied
for this shift away from ex post facto adjudication; likewise, in recent

13. For example, the uncertain regulation of insider trading includes questions such as, “Was
there a fiduciary duty breach?” or “what constitutes a benefit to a tipper?” There are no specific ex
ante rules that suggest answers to such questions; instead, courts adjudicate the questions ex post.
See ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, ch. 25
(2010).
14 . See GOLDMAN SACHS BUSINESS PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS COMMITTEE REPORT
(2010), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/committee-repor
t/business-standards-committee-report.html.
15. For example, one might ask whether the Abacus collateralized debt obligation transaction
was more analogous to the sale of financial instruments or to market-making.
16 . See EDWARD SWAN, BUILDING THE GLOBAL MARKET: A 4000 YEAR HISTORY OF
DERIVATIVES (2000). Early derivatives were privately negotiated contracts not covered by any specific regulatory regime in which the parties would expect to be able to enforce obligations through
contract-related litigation, if at all.
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years, financial institutions also have explicitly lobbied against and rejected both private adjudication and public ex ante rulemaking.17
Today, the over-the-counter derivatives markets—the largest markets in the world, financial or otherwise—are dominated by private legal
rules, typically specified in one or more standard form documents. In this
context, the most common source of private ex ante rules are the derivatives documents provided by the ISDA. The primary membership of
ISDA is composed of the major derivatives dealers, whose officers dominate the officer and director positions within the ISDA. 18 Derivatives
“end-users” are not permitted to vote or to serve as officers or directors.
Historically, ISDA has been an effective advocate for its dealer client
base and has been less sensitive to end-users.19
The core document used by most derivatives market participants to
document and govern their transactions is the ISDA Master Agreement
(ISDA Master). The ISDA Master contains a brief description of the
most basic boilerplate terms governing the relationship between two derivatives counterparties; it is rarely subject to extensive negotiation. In
addition to the ISDA Master, the counterparties also typically enter into
an ISDA Schedule Agreement (ISDA Schedule), which specifies more
detail about their particular relationship. The ISDA Master and ISDA
Schedule are roughly comparable to a corporation’s articles and bylaws,
respectively. Then, for individual transactions, the parties typically sign a
Confirmation, a third document that specifies the terms of a particular
derivative transaction. In the corporate context, a Confirmation is roughly analogous to a contract or the minutes from a board meeting approving
a contract.
Interestingly, ISDA documents typically do not provide for arbitration. In fact, the standard 1992 ISDA Master form does not contain an
arbitration clause. Instead, section 11(b) of the agreement provides that
each party submits irrevocably to the jurisdiction of the appropriate
courts (English courts or federal courts in the Southern District of New
York).
One reason ISDA agreements do not provide for arbitration is because suitability, or “know your customer,” requirements apply in arbitration. Although ISDA documents include non-reliance disclaimers that
17. The most prominent example involved the negotiations that led to the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 at the end of the Clinton Administration.
18. Board of Directors, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/board-of-directors/ (last visited
Oct. 23, 2013).
19 . See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 44–45, 140–50 (Public Affairs, 2009).
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purport to preclude application of suitability rules in arbitration, derivatives market participants might nevertheless prefer court to arbitration if
they perceive that judges (who are bound by the securities laws and rules
of contract) are more likely to enforce those disclaimers than arbitrators
(who are bound by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules).20 An
interesting question is to what extent the counterparty versus client distinction should matter in adjudicating suitability. Specifically, should an
ex ante agreed-upon classification by the parties affect whether the arbitration or adjudication quadrant is the appropriate form of regulation?
Like many financial contracts, ISDA documentation includes numerous private legal rules, such as the various representations and warranties of parties and the mechanisms for calculating payments owed
following credit events or default. Private parties can use the privatization of legal rules strategically based on information or sophistication
asymmetry, or potentially in ways that generate externalities. They can
lobby for rules that benefit ISDA members but disadvantage other private parties. For example, ISDA has successfully lobbied for legislation
and regulatory opinions in numerous nations confirming the enforceability of certain provisions. These nations have given a range of assurances
that they will enforce ISDA documents and language, including favorable protection for over-the-counter derivatives in bankruptcy, such as
enforceable netting and settlement outside the reach of the automatic
stay.
This favorable bankruptcy treatment of swaps is controversial, raising many questions.21 How should regulators address pressure between
ex ante private specification and ex post public adjudication? For example, what kinds of duties do counterparties to sophisticated financial contracts owe to each other? How should judges interpret a clause specifying

20. Historically, arbitration rules included a suitability principle, even in disputes involving
sophisticated financial parties and contracts. For example, NASD Rule of Fair Practice 2310(a),
promulgated pursuant to Section 15A of the Exchange Act, provided:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member
shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for each
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
FINRA Rule 2310(a) (repealed 2010), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.htm
l?rbid=2403&element_id=9859. This NASD suitability rule applies to institutions, as well as to
individuals, and historically, the vast majority of institutional end-users assumed that derivatives
dealers are subject to a suitability obligation. See Partnoy, supra note 3. The application of suitability
principles today is less clear.
21. Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009).
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that there are no such duties or that they are minimal? Obviously, judges
will show deference to the parties’ specifications in private agreements,
but should that deference be absolute?
At some point, a judge might find that a duty arises based on evidence of a substantial information or sophistication gap between the parties, especially if such a gap generated a degree of trust in the relationship. Likewise, an adjudicator might find that at some point a contract is
so one-sided that it takes on adhesion-like qualities, particularly if it is a
standard form contract not subject to negotiation.
For many transactions, the existing contract language might provide
a basis for an adjudicator to find that the more sophisticated party has
undertaken duties to the less sophisticated party. Even one-sided agreements include basic trust-related representations, and both parties presumably assumed that such representations are enforceable. More generally, parties expect that a duty of good faith and fair dealing will govern
their activities.
With respect to suitability, the key issue is the relative bargaining
power of the parties—not the absolute sophistication level of the less
sophisticated party. Relative bargaining power matters to the question of
whether a standard-form contract term is actually an agreed-to part of a
particular contract. If a term is not agreed upon, judicial creation of protective default rules can contribute to market efficiency. Absent these
rules, parties with substantial information or sophistication disadvantages
will exit, just as many end-users did from certain segments of the derivatives markets in the mid-1990s. Interestingly, when end-users began recovering substantial settlements related to those 1990s transactions, those
settlements created de facto default rules, or at least “default principles,”
which encouraged end-users to reenter the markets. A similar result
might follow from recent post-financial crisis settlements against banks.
However, those disputes are ongoing, and it remains unclear whether
they will be sufficiently broad to lead investors back into complex transactions based on subprime mortgages.
One explanation for ISDA’s dominance is that ISDA is simply
more efficient than other rule providers and that the economies of
providing standard-form contracts naturally will lead to a single provider.
However, although standard-form derivatives documentation can be cost
reducing, there are some reasons to believe that ISDA’s virtual monopoly on the creation of legal rules might itself be problematic. For instance,
ISDA’s first-mover advantage has created a substantial barrier to entry
for any competing provider. In addition, ISDA dealer members exercise
market power in creating legal rules. This market power is another example of a market failure that might lead regulators to be skeptical of ex
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ante rules-based contractual approaches and to implement an ex post
principles-based adjudication instead.
In general, privately sourced regulation is double-edged. On one
hand, it is likely to be more informed than it might otherwise be. On the
other hand, privately sourced regulation is likely to be less equitable and
balanced, and to favor derivatives dealers over end-users. Parties to financial contracts frequently value certainty and accordingly try to specify as many contingencies as possible in advance. Bond contracts, venture
capital term sheets, and merger agreements are examples of specifying
contingencies. The ex ante specifications in such contracts often evolve
into standard-form documents, in which many terms generally become
standard and are not negotiated. Even the corporation, in the view of
some scholars, has been primarily a private “nexus of contracts” among
various participants, including shareholders and stakeholders (though
much of corporate law involves the assessment of ambiguities and gaps
in the ex ante specifications). In sum, issues of timing and source of legal
rules are raised in numerous business contexts.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth an analytic model for assessing the timing
and source of regulation. It is meant to be a simple, straightforward
“idea” article, not to resolve the questions about the relative advantages
of each regulatory quadrant.
The central idea of the model is that one can distinguish regulatory
regimes by asking two questions: First, what is the timing of the specification of the rules or principles at issue? Are they specified ex ante or ex
post? Second, what is the source of the rules or principles? Are they public or private? The answers to these questions suggest four categories of
regulatory regime: contract, arbitration, regulation, and adjudication. The
model does not dictate which regime might be optimal in a particular
setting; however, it can be used to distinguish among regimes and to
trace how regimes might change over time.
As regulatory challenges spread throughout the world, including to
Asia, this timing-source model might be useful to policy makers and
market participants trying to assess optimal regulation. There are advantages and disadvantages to each quadrant, and the normative consequences of a shift from ex post adjudication to ex ante contractual private
ordering remain unclear. Nevertheless, the argument here is that understanding such a shift is preferable to simply ignoring it.

